The author read all of Maine's most important works & created this text which discusses the most valuable information to be gained from each work of Maine. The author believed that all the theories of Maine can now be found in this handy text, making it a valuable contribution to the student of the law.

Delivering high quality genomics-informed care to patients requires accurate test results whose clinical implications are understood. While other actors, including state agencies, professional organizations, and clinicians, are involved, this article focuses on the extent to which the federal agencies that play the most prominent roles — the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services enforcing CLIA and the FDA — effectively ensure that these elements are met and concludes by suggesting possible ways to improve their oversight of genomic testing.

Levinas never engaged closely with Fichte’s work, but there are two places in the chapter “Substitution,” in Otherwise than Being (1974), where he mentions Fichte by name. The point that Levinas underscores in both of these passages is that the other’s encounter with the subject is not the outcome of the subject’s freedom; it is not posited by the subject, as Fichte has it, but is prior to any free activity. The aim of this paper is to deepen the comparison (...) between Levinas and Fichte, giving special attention to Fichte's own novel theory of intersubjectivity and the summons. One result that emerges from this treatment is that both Levinas and Fichte view the second person in a way that has no equivalent in the current philosophical landscape. On this reading, each thinker views responsibility to the other, not only as an immediate and particular obligation, but also as an asymmetrical relation that gives the other moral priority. (shrink)

The increasing availability of passively observed data has yielded a growing interest in “data fusion” methods, which involve merging data from observational and experimental sources to draw causal conclusions. Such methods often require a precarious tradeoff between the unknown bias in the observational dataset and the often-large variance in the experimental dataset. We propose an alternative approach, which avoids this tradeoff: rather than using observational data for inference, we use it to design a more efficient experiment. We consider the case (...) of a stratified experiment with a binary outcome and suppose pilot estimates for the stratum potential outcome variances can be obtained from the observational study. We extend existing results to generate confidence sets for these variances, while accounting for the possibility of unmeasured confounding. Then, we pose the experimental design problem as a regret minimization problem subject to the constraints imposed by our confidence sets. We show that this problem can be converted into a concave maximization and solved using conventional methods. Finally, we demonstrate the practical utility of our methods using data from the Women’s Health Initiative. (shrink)

Bibliografie met commentaar per rubriek: feminisme/vrouwenbeweging, werkomstandigheden, gezondheidszorg, geweld/criminaliteit, recht/politiek, literatuur/kunst, sociaal-psychologische perspectieven etc.

Individual athletes, coaches and sports teams seek continuously for ways to improve performance and accomplishment in elite competition. New techniques of performance analysis are a crucial part of the drive for athletic perfection. This paper discusses the ethical importance of one aspect of the future potential of performance analysis in sport, combining the field of biomedicine, sports engineering and nanotechnology in the form of ‘Nanobiosensors’. This innovative technology has the potential to revolutionise sport, enabling real time biological data to be (...) collected from athletes that can be electronically distributed. Enabling precise real time performance analysis is not without ethical problems. Arguments concerning data ownership and privacy; data confidentiality; and athlete welfare are presented alongside a discussion of the use of the Precautionary Principle in making ethical evaluations. We conclude, that although the future potential use of Nanobiosensors in sports analysis offers many potential benefits, there is also a fear that it could be abused at a sporting system level. Hence, it is essential for sporting bodies to consider the development of a robust ethically informed governance framework in advance of their proliferated use. (shrink)

This discussion concerns the under-explored influence of Jacques Derrida on Paul B. Preciado and the autotheoretical enterprise that is Testo Junkie. Picking up on the deconstructive logic of contamination at work in Preciado’s early writings, the article reckons with autotheory as both a theoretical mode motored by the first person and an autobiographical mode interested in self-shaping. In so doing, it offers a genealogy of autotheory that finds its origins in Derrida’s disinterest in disciplinary purity and dislike of philosophical detachment, (...) at the same time as positioning Testo Junkie firmly within a French literary and philosophical context where it both intervenes in the activity of queer theorizing and antagonizes the highly popular genre of autofiction through a series of generic contaminations. Autotheory, in this itinerary, is inseparable from the self-writing project that Preciado undertakes and advocates, one that disidentifies from the fiction of a privately sexed and interior ‘self’. (shrink)

The British biologist, philosopher, and psychologist Conwy Lloyd Morgan is widely regarded as one of the founders of comparative psychology. He is especially well known for his eponymous canon, which aimed to provide a rule for the interpretation of mind from behavior. Emphasizing the importance of the context in which Morgan was working—one in which casual observations of animal behavior could be found in Nature magazine every week and psychology itself was fighting for scientific legitimacy—I provide an account (...) of Morgan’s vision for the comparative psychologist qua professional psychologist. To this end, I explore the important connection between Morgan and the evolutionary theorist, philosopher, and psychologist Herbert Spencer. It is from Spencer, I contend, that Morgan inherited a number of his key epistemological and methodological concerns about the nascent science of comparative psychology. This extends all the way to the canon, which only works as intended when paired with a Spencerian understanding of mental evolution as a progressive linear sequence. Far from being an incidental residue of a pre-Darwinian time, hierarchy was intentionally built into the very core of Morgan’s scientific comparative psychology. (shrink)

Waking, Dreaming, Being is an unusual book in many ways. I mention two. First, in some ways it is a memoir. Few philosophers started as a child doing the sort of philosophy that they did as a grown-up. Evan did. Evan grew up in the intellectually fertile world of the Lindisfarne Association, the collaborative of scientists, artists, ecologists, and contemplatives founded by his father, William Irwin Thompson, a polymath, whom I had the pleasure of meeting in 2004 at the Crestone (...) Zen Monastery in Colorado.Evan’s dad taught him Raja Yoga as a boy—when he was seven!—and read him Upanishadic children’s stories. Lindisfarne was the antithesis of a C. P. Snow–style Two Cultures environment where the sciences and... (shrink)

The Human Agenda is the first Special Edition of The Cambridge Journal of Law, Politics, and Art (CJLPA), an interdisciplinary journal founded at the University of Cambridge. Focused on the unique intersections of law, politics and art in the context of human rights, contributors to the Special Edition include David Baragwanath, Luis Moreno Ocampo, Nadia Murad, Nancy Hollander, Andrew Clapham, Vladimir Osechkin, Mansour al-Omari, and many others. A full table of contents is available through the publication's own page.

If tokens of 'I' have a sense as well as a reference the question immediately arises of what account to give of their sense. One influential kind of account, of which Gareth Evans provides the best developed instance, attempts to elucidate the sense of 'I' partly in terms of the distinctive functional role possessed by thoughts containing this sense ('I'-thoughts). Accounts of this kind seem to entail that my 'I'-thoughts cannot be entertained by anyone other than me, a consequence (...) generally thought unacceptable. I defend it. I also justify a functional role account of the sense of 'I'. The result should be to make plausible an account of the sense of 'I' in terms of the functional role of 'I'-thoughts. (shrink)

Over the past few decades there has been a rebellion brewing in the world of Parmenides scholarship. Most of the things you probably think you know about the man have come under serious and sustained attack. No longer is it safe to accept on trust the view—which G. E. L. Owen so forcefully defended in his 1960 paper “Eleatic Questions”—that according to Parmenides there exists only one thing, ungenerated, indestructible, unchanging, indivisible, and spherical. Nor is it safe to assume (...) that he had no real commitment to empirical theorizing, and sought only to demolish the cosmological tradition that was initiated and developed by his Ionian predecessors Thales, Anaximander, and Anaximenes. All of.. (shrink)

Mind recently published a review by Simon Glendinning of Michael L. Morgan’s Levinas’ Ethical Politics which solely focused on the final chapter, a lengthy and robust engagement of the existing lit...

The papers gathered here were first presented at an “Author Meets Critics” invited session that I organized for the Pacific Division of the American Philosophical Association meeting, held in Vancouver, April 1–5, 2015, on Evan Thompson’s book Waking, Dreaming, Being: Self and Consciousness in Neuroscience, Meditation, and Philosophy. Thompson opened the session with a précis of his book, which was followed by critical commentaries from John Dunne, Owen Flanagan, and Jay Garfield; Jennifer Windt was also an invited contributor to (...) this symposium although she was not able to attend the session. Together with Thompson’s reply, these papers are presented here in their final, revised format.Thompson’s... (shrink)

If we are material beings living in a material world -- and all the scientific evidence suggests that we are -- then we must find existential meaning, if there is such a thing, in this physical world. We must cast our lot with the natural rather than the supernatural. Many Westerners with spiritual inclinations are attracted to Buddhism -- almost as a kind of moral-mental hygiene. But, as Owen Flanagan points out in The Bodhisattva's Brain, Buddhism is hardly naturalistic. (...) In _The Bodhisattva's Brain_, Flanagan argues that it is possible to discover in Buddhism a rich, empirically responsible philosophy that could point us to one path of human flourishing. Some claim that neuroscience is in the process of validating Buddhism empirically, but Flanagan's naturalized Buddhism does not reduce itself to a brain scan showing happiness patterns. "Buddhism naturalized," as Flanagan constructs it, offers instead a fully naturalistic and comprehensive philosophy, compatible with the rest of knowledge -- a way of conceiving of the human predicament, of thinking about meaning for finite material beings living in a material world. (shrink)

This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work is in the public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be (...) preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. To ensure a quality reading experience, this work has been proofread and republished using a format that seamlessly blends the original graphical elements with text in an easy-to-read typeface. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant. (shrink)

According to hyper-Humeanism, the world of “fact” is utterly distinct from the realm of “value”-that is, the realm of morality and religion.This is a well-known philosophical position, and it more or less follows from some well-known philosophical doctrines (e.g., logical positivism, and neo-Wittgensteinianism), but its appeal is not limited to philosophers. Indeed, an acceptance of hyper-Humeanism seems to be at the root of Stephen Jay Gould’s recent defense of the thesis that science and religion are utterly distinct. Gould’s stated aim (...) in defending this thesis is to settle, or perhaps reveal as illusory, various conflicts between science and religion. However, I arguenot only that Gould’s version of this thesis is defective, but also that hyper-Humeanism itself is false. If I am right, then “facts” and “values”-science and religion in particular-can overlap in philosophically interesting ways. (shrink)

We report on an interview-based study of decision-making capacity in two classes of patients suffering from depression. Developing a method of second-person hermeneutic phenomenology, we articulate the distinctive combination of temporal agility and temporal inability characteristic of the experience of severely depressed patients. We argue that a cluster of decision-specific temporal abilities is a critical element of decision-making capacity, and we show that loss of these abilities is a risk factor distinguishing severely depressed patients from mildly/moderately depressed patients. We explore (...) the legal and clinical consequences of this result. (shrink)

A self-fulfilling prophecy is, roughly, a prediction that brings about its own truth. Although true predictions are hard to fault, self-fulfilling prophecies are often regarded with suspicion. In this article, we vindicate this suspicion by explaining what self-fulfilling prophecies are and what is problematic about them, paying special attention to how their problems are exacerbated through automated prediction. Our descriptive account of self-fulfilling prophecies articulates the four elements that define them. Based on this account, we begin our critique by showing (...) that typical self-fulfilling prophecies arise due to mistakes about the relationship between a prediction and its object. Such mistakes—along with other mistakes in predicting or in the larger practical endeavor—are easily overlooked when the predictions turn out true. Thus we note that self-fulfilling prophecies prompt no error signals; truth shrouds their mistakes from humans and machines alike. Consequently, self-fulfilling prophecies create several obstacles to accountability for the outcomes they produce. We conclude our critique by showing how failures of accountability, and the associated failures to make corrections, explain the connection between self-fulfilling prophecies and feedback loops. By analyzing the complex relationships between accuracy and other evaluatively significant features of predictions, this article sheds light both on the special case of self-fulfilling prophecies and on the ethics of prediction more generally. (shrink)

Accession Number: ATLA0001712242; Hosting Book Page Citation: p 430-452.; Language(s): English; General Note: Bibliography: p 451-452.; Issued by ATLA: 20130825; Publication Type: Essay.

Current debate in metaethics includes the question of objectivity. What does it mean for a moral prescription to be objective? It is easy to see how matters of fact are objective, and it is also easy to see how matters of taste are subjective. But what about matters of morality? Given the diversity in moral beliefs and practices it appears these cannot be matters of fact. Are they thus matters of taste? If so, we are left with the unlivable conclusion (...) that all moral prescriptions are beyond rational scrutiny. David Hume expressed these problems in a way that continues to be influential today: ‘Tis as little contrary to reason to prefer even my own acknowled'd lesser good to my greater’ (Hume, 2003: 2.III.ii). Resolving problems about moral objectivity is further complicated by the philosophical presuppositions of analytic philosophy that have dominated the 20th century, initiated in the work of G.E. Moore, and promulgated in theories such as logical positivism and ordinary language philosophy. Contemporary thinkers from both the cognitivist and the non‐cognitivist camps have tried to demonstrate that moral claims are objective in the sense of being subject independent. By considering contemporary appeals to the ideally rational self to establish objectivity, and objections to rationality as a ground for objectivity, it will be argued that objectivity can be grounded in the good which in turn is grounded in human nature. This approach can be found in the Socratic denial of knowingly doing evil, and out of this a foundation for moral objectivity can be developed that does not require an appeal to the individual's mental state and which preserves individual responsibility for knowing the good. (shrink)

One of the predominant iterations of the metaphor of entanglement in the nineteenth century is found in the closing paragraph of Charles Darwin’s On the Origin of Species. Darwin’s image of an “entangled bank, clothed with many plants of many kinds, with birds singing on the bushes, with various insects flitting about,” serves as a synecdoche for the patterns of biological interdependence and variation that animate the evolutionary process of natural selection.1 The “entangled bank” is both the scene and the (...) symbolic illustration of creaturely increase and multiplication. We cannot escape the influence of heredity in Darwin’s schema, just as surely as the imagined bank of vegetation will wreathe and entwine.. (shrink)

Superoxide is produced by a NADPH oxidase of phagocytic cells and contributes to their microbicidal activities. The oxidase is activated when receptors in the neutrophil plasma membrane bind to the target microbe. These receptors recognise antibodies and complement fragments which coat the target cell. The oxidase electron transport chain, located in the plasma membrane, comprises a low potential cytochrome b heterodimer (gp 91‐phox and p22‐phox) associated with FAD. It is non‐functional until at least three proteins, p67‐phox, p47‐phox and p21rac (and (...) possibly others), move from the cytosol to dock on the cytochrome b. The docking involves the interaction of SH3 domains may become exposed follwoing phosphorylation of p47‐phox by protein kinase C or, in model systems, by addition of arachidonic acid to reconstitution mixtures. Following the docking process the electron‐transporting component is able to transfer electrons from NADPH to oxygen. This electrogenic event is charge‐compensated by the opening of a prton channel. Components of the oxidase are expressed in non‐phagocytes, where their function is uncretain but could be related to some signal function of superoxide. (shrink)

Plato. Aristotle. Augustine. Hume. Kant. Hegel. Every student of philosophy needs to know the history of the philosophical discourse such giants have bequeathed us. Philosopher C. Stephen Evans brings his expertise to this daunting task as he surveys the history of Western philosophy, from the Pre-Socratics to Nietzsche and postmodernism—and every major figure and movement in between.

Volume 23, Issue 2, April 2024, Page 237-242.

This paper explores the role of strategic conversations in corporate social responsibility (CSR) strategy formation. The authors suggest that explicitly engaging stakeholders in the CSR strategy-making process, through the mechanism of strategic conversations, will minimize future stakeholder concerns and enhance CSR strategy making. In addition, suggestions for future research are offered to enable a better understanding of effective strategic conversation processes in CSR strategy making and the resulting performance outcomes.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:“Though This Be Madness, Yet There Is Method in ’T”A Positive Account of MadnessValentina Cardella, PhD (bio)What does it mean to be mad? How can we define mental disorder? The question is still widely discussed among psychiatrists and philosophers, and what exactly distinguishes sanity and insanity remains unclear. Despite this lack of clarity, the common conceptualization of madness is that mental disorders are impairments in rationality: people with mental (...) disorders are generally believed to have impairments in reasoning and logic (Bermúdez, 2001; Edwards, 1981; Harvey, Watkins, Mansell, & Shafran, 2004).Yet, the result of this conception is that we fail to understand madness. We do not understand how, for example, schizophrenic patients can be more logical than healthy people in some reasoning tasks (Mellet et al., 2006; Owen, Cutting, & David, 2007), or delusional patients can be perfectly rational in defending their ideas (Cardella, 2020), or depressive people can be more realistic than non-clinical subjects (Moore & Fresco, 2012). In contrast, if we consider rationality as the core feature of sanity, we fail to understand sanity, too, because normal people exhibit many kinds of biases and heuristics, and thus irrationality is widespread in the general population (Bortolotti, 2020; Johnson-Laird, 2006; Evans, 2002; Kahneman, Tversky, & Slovic, 1982).In his paper, Garson focuses on Late Modern theorists of madness (Locke, Kant, Wigan, and Heinroth) to reframe the problem and provide a positive account of mental disorder. These authors contrast madness to idiocy, rather than sanity, and therefore their conception of madness is very different: “while idiocy is marked by the diminished, or even abolished, functioning of the reasoning power, madness is marked by its perverse functioning. The mad person “has” reason, but deploys it in a perverse, improper, or unseemly manner” (Garson, 2023, p. 286).In his reading of Late Modern authors, Garson provides a new ontology of mental disorder, that goes beyond an absence of reason, and has also political and social implications. Furthermore, he reminds us that every scientific discipline has its philosophical assumptions. In defining madness, [End Page 305] we cannot help but choose a contrasting class, and each choice will have very different consequences. Even if psychiatry is a medical discipline, which aims to endorse a neutral view of mental disorder, it is impossible for it to be unbiased and impartial. All the more so, for it has to deal with human suffering and fragility.But, in this article, there is one crucial question that remains unanswered. In his analysis of Late Modern theorization of madness, Garson comes to the conclusion that madness is marked by a perverse deployment of reason. Yet, who decides when reason is deployed in a perverse manner? While the lack of rationality is something that we can detect easily enough, the task of defining precisely what is an ‘improper’ or ‘perverse’ use of reason is much harder. In other words, it seems to me that, in replacing the ‘lack of rationality’ paradigm with ‘the perverse rationality paradigm,’ the question of what is madness still remains open, and, most important, some normative aspects remain necessary. To recognize when rationality is improperly used, we have to adopt an evaluative stance, which defines what a proper use of reason would be.Valentina [email protected] University of MessinaValentina Cardella Valentina Cardella is Associate Professor of Philosophy of Language at the University of Messina, Italy. Her research interests encompass cognitive sciences, philosophy of language, and psychopathology.The author reports no conflicts of interest.Commentary submitted on June 13, 2023Accepted on June 13, 2023ReferencesBermúdez, J. L. (2001). Normativity and rationality in delusional psychiatric disorders. Mind and Language 16, 457–93. Google ScholarBortolotti, L. (2020). The epistemic innocence of irrational beliefs. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Google ScholarCardella, V. (2020). Rationality in mental disorders: too little or too much? European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 16 (2), 13–36. Google ScholarEdwards, R. B. (1997). Mental health as rational autonomy. In Edwards, R. B. (ed.), Ethics of psychiatry: Insanity, rational autonomy, and mental health care. New York: Prometheus Books. Google ScholarEvans, J. (2002). Logic and human reasoning: an assessment of the deduction paradigm. Psychological Bulletin 128... (shrink)

In ‘The Presuppositions of Religious Pluralism and the Need for Natural Theology’ I argue that there are four important presuppositions behind John Hick’s form of religious pluralism that successfully support it against what I call fideistic exclusivism. These are i) the ought/can principle, ii) the universality of religious experience, iii) the universality of redemptive change, and iv) a view of how God (the Eternal) would do things. I then argue that if these are more fully developed they support a different (...) kind of exclusivism, what I call rational exclusivism, and become defeaters for pluralism. In order to explain rational exclusivism and its dependence on these presuppositions I consider philosophers J.P. Moreland, William Lane Craig, and Alvin Plantinga, who offer arguments for their forms of exclusivism but I maintain that they continue to rely on fideism at important points. I then give an example of how knowledge of the Eternal can be achieved. (shrink)

The fragility of democracy and the political aesthetics of public art -- Voices and places: the space of public art and Wodiczko's the homeless projection -- Democracy's "empty place": Rawls's political liberalism and Derrida's democracy to come -- Public art's "plain tablet": the political aesthetics of contemporary art -- Democracy and public art: Badiou and Ranciere -- The political aesthetics of Chicago's Millennium Park -- The political aesthetics of New York's National 9/11 Memorial -- Public art as an act of (...) citizenship -- Badiou on "being and the void.". (shrink)